Generic Aircraft
From the C-150 through high performance aircraft a landing according to plan can only be achieved after the execution of a precise series of steps. Each plane carries it own flying visual reference points. Once you learn to see and apply the 'point' to a C-150 you have the basics for transferal of reading and application of the 'point' to higher performance planes. You are not learning just to land a C-150. Differing amounts of flaps will vary the visual point. Fewer degrees of flaps will flatten the approach and make judgment more difficult. Holding the nose wheel off the runway will be easier. The best parallel to this is the way we transfer our driving skills from car, to van, to truck.

Know operational procedures as they apply to the aircraft. If you are new to the aircraft, spend enough cockpit time before beginning to become familiar with the POH and all the knobs and switches. Direction and method of movement is just as important as location. Make the operating procedures into a checklist that includes those of the POH adapted to those you usually use. You will be behind the operation of the aircraft if your checklist does not include the information you need to know how to make the airplane do what you want it to do, when you should be doing it.

All the landing and takeoff numbers are based on gross weights, the pilot should know the percentage that his operating weight may be below that gross weight. An aircraft lighter than gross weight will 'float' or land fast when the approach speed is that book speed. The minimum approach speed of your aircraft should be referenced to the 1.4 Vso in the pattern and 1.3 Vso over the threshold. It is usual for these speeds to be based on the actual weight of the aircraft as Vref. If the aircraft is below gross then the stabilized approach speed and stall speed will be slower than the 'book'. Any excess speed will eat up useable runway. 90% of landing accidents are due to excess speed.

Dealing with performance limitations has always been crucial in the art of landing and takeoff. Limitations are determined by the POH at the time of aircraft certification. Aircraft weight, speed, Vso-(Minimum safe operating speed), and placards set these limitations. Airport conditions such as wind direction and velocity, surface conditions, approach corridor, surface conditions, and traffic set other limitations. The last set of limitations are determined by the pilot. Skill in power changes, attitude control (flaps), trim, coordination, speed control, pattern size, and runway alignment set these limitations.

Desirable Traits of a Pilot
--Acceptance that mistakes will happen and can be safely corrected. Able to take criticism is a necessary part of the learning process.
--Accepts the existence of past, present, and future mistakes and trains to handle difficult situations and increase ability to cope.
--Develop and maintain awareness that mistakes and problems are just waiting to happen. Treat them as learning opportunities.
--Immediate detection of mistakes, first their own, secondly crew members, then of others.
--Make the correction smoothly, uneventfully, with a minimum of effort. The proficient pilot won't let others notice either before or after.
--Advise others in the cockpit of the error and others outside the cockpit when appropriate.
--Has the strength of character required to say "NO" when conditions are marginal. Sees own weaknesses that require instruction and practice. Will learn from mistakes and seeks variety of experience.
--Has the strength of character required in guiding others in saying, "NO".
--Has the ability to make the quick, accurate judgmental decisions required for safe flying. Like go-around, 180, request vectors, etc.

As a new pilot you will react to a situation much differently than does an old pilot who has already anticipated the situation. The old pilot has no problem admitting deficiencies of skill or knowledge. He will duck under an overcast before getting caught on top. He will stay upwind of a moving storm and give twenty-mile clearance to a thunder cell. Any pilot regardless of flight time who lets ego jeopardize safety is heading toward an accident. You are not supposed to know everything and you never will. The more skeptical you are about yourself, your sources of information, the system, and your equipment the better. Become a knowledge seeker. Your end desire should be to become an old pilot. Life and flying are much the same; gather all the data you can, select the truth as revealed by the data; select from the available options; lastly, get lucky. Accidents usually follow a situation where the pilot waited too long to make a decision; where the pilot failed to know or find other options; and, where the pilot, had he known but where and how to seek help, would have found it.

Evaluate your go/no-go decisions on whether you see any merit in positioning yourself where you are playing the odds of luck. Is the reliance on luck really worth it? The no-go option is always a viable option and should be part of your pre-flight trip planning. Make arrangements ahead of time on the probability that after a three day trip you may not be able to return as planned. The trip out may have been fine; the trip back is not necessary NOW. The limiting criteria are ceilings and visibility. If one of the other is a safety hazard the no-go decision reigns supreme.

VFR flight has suddenly become a stressful way to fly. The wrong decision can be the leading cause for an accident. Being an experienced pilot is not an advantage. Experienced pilots just begin by getting deeper into trouble than the inexperienced. The best analysis of whether to make a flight can best be answered by three questions.

1. Is this flight really necessary.
2. What happens if we don't go and for how long will it be significant.
3. Flexibility in making your judgment decisions is essential.

With pilot error causing at least 70% and perhaps as many as 80% of aircraft accidents, it is up to the pilot community to correct in training and post-training flight those pilots whose judgment is lacking. Some pilots are prone to making very bad flying decisions.

Re-treading a pilot who has flown before requires the renewal of a multiplicity of proficiency skills. Some skills are more likely to deteriorate than others. Emergency instrument skills fall the most. It is possible to make an instantaneous improvement in you flying just by carrying with you an attitude of openness and acceptance that you will need some refreshment of your skills.

The crux of a successful flying career is the use of good judgment. The pilot's omnipresent prerogative is to make selective safe decisions. There are, to my way of thinking, two classes of safe decisions, the first class is in the foreseen future as revealed in preflight planning, preflight, pilot proficiency and aircraft performance. The second class of safe decisions lies with the unforeseen events related to weather, aircraft performance, and pilot capability.

Ideally, every instructor pilot in the past will have exposed his students to the wealth of experience he has acquired along with the accompanying judgmental sequences. However, this is not an ideal world nor does the economics of flight instruction provide the opportunity to adequately cover both classes of 'safe decisions' mentioned previously. Textbooks, videos, ground instruction and flight instruction are primarily directed to the foreseeable needs of the student pilot.

Unfortunately, the unforeseeable class of experience constitutes a vast area of judgmental opportunities for which there is only limited simulated exposure for the general aviation student. What I see as a critical need in aviation training is directly related to the way the FAA and NTSB second-guesses all of the judgment decisions leading to every accident investigated. I read about hundreds of aircraft accidents every year, only a few have fully developed sequential analysis of decisions leading to the accident. The second-guessing should include how variations of the decision making process could have changed the results.

What is needed is a programmed curriculum such as is available in the airline simulators for general aviation pilots. With the latest interactive video and computer technology I see the judgment situation capable of radical improvement necessary. Perhaps, actual flight videos could be made with a network of scenarios to describe how an accident chain grows, how it can acquire branches leading to different results or broken entirely. I can see the potential development be one of multiple screens hydra-heading into other screens where interactive decision making results in multiple decision-making possibilities and unexpected consequences. The greatest single in improvement in flight safety is possible if we can only find a radical way to improve decision-making.

--Recurrent pilot training and seminars can influence Flight safety and decision making.
--We should find a better way to interactively share flight experience.
--Pilots need to find way to share experiences by flying together.
--Pilots should broaden their experiences by flying to new places at different times.
--Pilots should have a continuous reading and learning program.
--Aircraft checkouts should be comprehensive rather than 'sweetheart' rides.
--Learning the right-way the first time should be the only way.
--Unlearning is the most expensive and dangerous way to improve flying.

There is no question that all pilots, organizations, and government agencies need to work on improving decision-making judgment as a critical adjunct to flight safety. We need to utilize newer resources and technology since the human factor has neared its limits of traditional training, proficiency and experience. The economic limits of time, effort and practice constrain traditional methods.

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