149. Am taking student on short flight CCR to OAK as prelude to her making the flight solo. Visibility excellent as far as Orinda. Haze makes Oakland airport barely visible as we reach Grizzly Peak. Without her being aware she makes 15 degree left turn. I ask if she can still see the peninsula by OAK. She can't. I point out her 15 degree turn and have her come back to 180. Now she sees the airport through the haze. Again, very slowly she starts a turn to the right. Again she loses the airport in the haze. I put her back on 180 and the airport reappears. Lesson: In low visibility conditions your heading may be more important than checkpoints.
150. Student to solo CCR to Rio Vista. I had made flight with student previous late afternoon and had not soloed him because of approaching darkness. I had reviewed with him light requirements and light switch positions as well as need for flash lights at dusk. Flight takes .8 hour per round trip. Flew with student to Rio Vista with no problem and returned to base of tower 1/2 hour before sunset. Got out of plane but forgot to have student turn on nav lights. Student is very deliberate in use of checklists and flight preparation so sits at base of tower for several minutes before taxi. For some reason taxis to 19R for takeoff. After delay requests left turn on course Rio Vista. I'm in tower and controller queries me as to left turn requirement. Controller is experienced but relatively new at CCR. .8 hours later 07U calls up for left base to right runway. Left runway is closed because of shorted-out lighting. One aircraft on VOR approach, 3 aircraft in right traffic touch-and-go patterns, one aircraft making left downwind arrival. ATC busy.
My student reports 2 mile base but not in sight of ATC and told to report 1 mile base. Sighted by me and ATC and told to widen to the right to follow traffic on final. IFR traffic told to overfly left runway at 1500'. This aircraft has very large and bright landing light. 07U does not widen to right. ATC again advises 07U to turn right to follow and asked if traffic is in sight. 07U does not widen to the right. (Student concerned about IFR traffic because a right turn would be directly toward that aircraft. Student unaware of significance of altitude restriction and route to this aircraft by ATC.) Student again told to widen to right but fails to comply so ATC gives command to make climbing left turn to proceed eastbound.
Aircraft on right downwind given 360 for spacing. 07U proceeds east out past abandoned airport. Is turned on wide downwind and wide base by ATC. Meanwhile, IFR aircraft executes missed, one or two aircraft do touch-and-gos and the inbound to left downwind circles abandoned airport. ATC confuses numbers of two aircraft and gives contradictory instructions only to catch error and apologize. Unidentified apparently NORDO aircraft appears over approach end of 14L and makes climbing left turn. Very confused situation finally gets sorted out and 07U makes long final approach to 19R and good landing. It's dark. Enough blame for everyone. ATC admitted failure to advise and clarify to student of IFR aircraft restrictions. Student at fault not following ATC instructions and not advising ATC of why he was failing to comply. Instructor at fault not allowing enough extra time for student to proceed at deliberate comfort pace for making flight in daylight. In hindsight, there are several ways the problem could have been more easily resolved if student had properly communicated his concerns.
151. Second student solo at CCR. Student departs 19R for right traffic. On his departure tower begins changing all arrivals and local pattern traffic into 32 R-L traffic. Student proceeds right downwind on 19R and is advised to make right turn across airport for downwind 32R. No response from student who continues on downwind. Student again advised to make right turn for downwind on 32R. No response. Several attempts to contact student by ATC without success. About two miles from airport student turns downwind for 32. When abeam 32 numbers student is cleared for the option and student responds and makes two touch-and gos and a full stop.
Instructor is in tower during all of the preceding and is as bewildered as ATC. Departs tower and meets student on ramp. Listens to tape of student and verifies that no ATC communications were coming through the radio as were none of the student's efforts to request clearance until abeam numbers on 32R. Takes tape up to tower and plays both to tower chief and controller involved. Remarkable student flight under such conditions.
S. F. Chronicle, Wednesday, October 28, 1992 (Picture caption)
152. A single-engine Cessna airplane on the way from Livermore to Hayward ran out of fuel and landed safely on Interstate 580 near the Center Street Overpass in Castro Valley yesterday afternoon. The plane touched down in the westbound landed and came to rest in the center divider about 3:20 p.m. The California Highway Patrol initially cleared the pilot, 66 year-old Burl Burris of San Leandro, to gas up and fly off, but the Federal Aviation Administration rejected the idea, a CHP spokesman said. Instead the plane was pushed to a nearby commuter parking lot, from where it will have to trucked away.
153. Observed pilot making right downwind to Rio Vista for 25 when 12 kt wind favored runway 7. Advised from ground but pilot proceeded anyway with no apparent problem. We departed Rio Vista in Piper 966. Using checklist for start pilot tuned boost pump on and immediately off. I questioned his turning it off and not checking pressure. He said that he had visually checked pressure and that I was making him nervous.
We started engine with pump on. Pilot did not lean after start or while taxiing. Instructor did. At runup instructor had to enrich mixture. Just prior to taking runway pilot switched tanks. Instructor suggested remaining on present tank because of takeoff/landing hazards associated with tank changes on takeoff and pattern altitudes. Departed runway 7 and pilot initiated right downwind turn until advised that the pattern was to the left.
155. Pilot had flown from CCR at 1000' "so he could see ground" but had complained about the limited visibility. On departing Rio Vista, Instructor suggested 1500' and then 3000' for return. Pilot apparently unaware of VFR visibility FARs in a practical application. At 3000' Mt. Diablo became clearly visible as was the ground. Pilot chose to fly direct to CCR VOR until advised that this, under marginal weather conditions, was like playing in the middle of an IFR freeway. Pilot then chose to report over West Pittsburg although we were at least 3 miles east of that position. ATC advised of traffic NE bound. Pilot made turn toward Willow Pass which would have put us directly in the path of the outbound traffic. Instructor took over aircraft. Instructor proceeded west bound to CCR ammo dump thence to abandoned airport and base entry to 32.
156. A month or so prior to this flight I observed this pilot pushing 5 by the spinner. I tried to correct his procedure by recommending pushing on the propeller close to the hub. He indicated that he had been instructed never to touch the propeller. Conclusion: A very inadequate PA 28 checkout is being given or, the pilot is essentially incompetent but lucky to have survived. Gene Whitt is picky. 11-18-03 I gave another pilot a required club 6-month checkride, Took
1.5 hours during the preflight to fill in all the knowledge blanks he had in preflighting PA-28.
157. On an overcast day, I was trying to find a safe area to do the airwork required for an aircraft checkout. I contacted Napa and they gave me clearance to do the work in the upper 1000' of their Class D airspace. We were the only legal aircraft in a space 1000' by 8 miles in diameter. By monitoring Napa's frequency we would know of any legal aircraft. It was like having your own private sand box.
158. A typical example of a need for situational awareness occurred when a student and I made our call-up to CCR from Clayton requesting a right base to 32R. Immediately afterwards another aircraft called in from the W. Pittsburg area also requesting a base entry. I suggested that the student change our request to a straight-in entry. This would not affect our time of flight but would provide a more safe arrival. Draw it out so you can see several reasons why this is so.
159. Student late so instructor pre-flighted C-150. Found right fuel tank cap cross-threaded so that rear was tilted up 1/4 inch. Had already called for fuel because right tank was reading empty and left was less than 1/4 full. Plane has flown 1.2 hours. Notes problem to line crew chief and club maintenance.
160. After nine continuous days of rain had scheduled flight with student. His preflight showed red fuel in right tank. Fuel looked funny but no distinctive line to indicate water/gas mix. Poured on to dry part of ramp. Water! Red algae had formed. At first looked like 80/87 gas. Checked fuel cap. (Same aircraft as previous item (159) Right cap again cross-threaded only the front is cocked up. Over one gallon of water.
161. Radar advisories for over-flight of military air base with all heavy transports.(Travis) Level at 3500' southbound headed mid field. Several heavies in pattern. KC-10 does go-around and climbs in left traffic. ATC asks if we see KC-10. We admit visual contact. ATC gives no further mention of KC-10 as it turns crosswind and then downwind at 4000' in front of us. Advise ATC that we were making 360 for wake turbulence avoidance. On resuming original course hit residue of KC-10 wake turbulence. No problem! That weekend visited RAPCON and talked to supervisor. Advised that 'book' placed all responsibility on VFR pilots to see and avoid. Suspect that many pilots might not realize the full implications of establishing visual contact when VFR and getting radar advisories.
Some of the time it may be better not to 'see' traffic.
162. Many concerns are unspoken. The unspoken fear of every passenger is what do I do if something happens to the pilot. The pilot who fails to warn passengers of changes in sound, thumps and bumps before they happen is creating needless tension. Warn passengers that crosswind landings are done on one wheel. Flight operations where the ground and speed of the plane are apparent bothers some far more than does flight at higher altitudes. Flight in or near clouds give similar effects. The sensations that create pleasure in the pilot can worry the passenger.
163. While giving experienced pilots refresher training I will, without their knowing, put the fuel shut-off valve in the "off" position prior to pre-flight. I was quite surprised recently when the "off" position did not work and the pilot proceeded to the runup area. It may be a good idea to confirm the correct operation of this valve when you fly by checking it on the ground.
164. At what point is a G.A. tire not airworthy? Operations with low tire pressures do seen and unseen damage. You will not be held accountable until something happens.
165. Took pilot of 25 years experience up in 172. Unable to meet private pilot standards in any maneuver. Contended that he has never had problems holding airspeed in climbing turns, altitude in level turns, going to slow flight and performing turns etc. before. Very tense when nose rises to obstruct view over nose. Must be the instructor. Makes only short approaches to landings. Stays close to runway. Lands in three-point contact of wheels. Never does it when by himself, he says. Has habit of changing hands during maneuvers. Unusual twisted grips on yoke. Unusual? Tense!
166. Night flight last night was quite an experience...we preflight and discover the panel lights are out. (Check circuit breaker, look for loose connection, etc.) Go, no-go...I've got two red flashlights, one with a popsicle stick taped to it for a bite--a trick from my sailing days--so we decide to go--good exercise for cockpit crisis management we decide. After getting over my anxieties of the first couple of t&g's with no instrument lights I start to grease 'em--well, close anyway, so off we head for BLI 30nm away.
No problems, except nuisance of not having an instrument lit when I need a glance...my jaw was getting tired of holding the mini-light, so my instructor was wanding the panel with it. Get clearance to land 16, but immediately hear a commuter announce on visual for 34, about 3 miles behind us. So I bear off for a little more room to set up downwind, but when we are about at midfield report, ask tower to verify clearance for 16. Confirmed, we are looking back to try and find the commuter behind us, inbound straight. We announce base turn 16 and then see the commuter on short final 34. It clears active as we are about short final and all is well again. But--my question:
Is this a common occurrence to have an IFR approaching OPPOSITE when on final approach? Of course, the Horizon Air was much faster and did clear active before we were over the threshold but it was unsettling and I was planning a 360 just in case. What if commuter had to go-around? Does one trust the tower in a case like this? (We HAD confirmed clearance). My instructor said it was the closest opposed separation she has experienced.
So we do a few circuits at BLI, then off to a small airport in the San Juan Islands. Circle field (can't land due to noise abatement restriction) and head for home. Enter 45 for home field and try to activate runway lights...no response. Just now the little maglight goes dim, reach for spare and find that my flight bag has slid aft during the power-on-stall practice and can't be reached. So, here we are in the pattern, no panel lights and no runway lights! I ask her to call (squinting at the panel in the dark) altitude and airspeed as I set up to overfly with landing light on to determine threshold/centerline location for a go-around. Thank goodness I've paid attention to keypoint ref's for turns during daylight practice. Good old local knowledge. We are able to find runway, memorize ref's off ramp lights and go around for a landing. We come around a second time with her calling performance off the gauges she can barely see, and we manage to pick up the centerline and I make the best TD of the night--the gear just sighs onto the runway.
My instructor: "Doug, you've become a pilot! Did you know that? Do you feel like it? I see a lot of confidence here. You stayed cool and made good decisions. We could have diverted back to Anacortes if we had to, so we had options here...I just want to sleep." Well, needless to say, my confidence has gone up a notch or two. I now know I can still think when the situation is tight and appreciate your words on never reducing your options to one.
Gene says, "This flight should never have started and the worst thing possible happened. They got away with it."
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